Tag Archives: post election violence

Raila leaves the race . . .

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Raila Odinga Kenya president campaign

[Update: since I have not been actively writing here for several months, I may have been a bit hasty in offering here an assessment of Raila’s immediate legacy in current Kenyan politics upon hearing the news of his unfortunate passing from heart failure in India. Those who grew up with Raila’s role in opposing dictatorship through brutal detention and have stayed continuously emotionally engaged with Kenya over the years—especially Kenyans, who do not have the option of pulling back as I have as an American —will feel the weight of a mighty tree falling and the sudden change of light, landscape and horizon. In other words, this post may have been a bit “too soon” as well as superficial. I will endeavor to do more justice to Raila’s impact ahead after the initial memorials.]

[See also the eulogy and remembrance in The Kenya Times from former US Ambassador Michael Ranneberger who served through the 2006-07 campaign and election and PEV, the peace deal and the constitutional referendum under Government of National Unity during Kibaki’s second term. And Jeffrey Gettleman remembering Raila campaigning in 2007 to be denied by the blatant rigging.

Raila’s primary definitive legacy is Kenya’s 2010 Constitution, negotiated as a result of his 2007 campaign which I believe clearly garnered the most votes and led him to the temporary but critical post of Prime Minister for Kibaki’s second term from 2008-2013 as part of the February 28 peace deal between Raila and Kibaki.

The peace deal did not result in the fully formed power sharing contemplated but it was enough to get to a reform Constitution through the elite establishment gauntlet so long as the sole executive power of the presidency was retained (in other words, the Prime Minister position would go away). Devolution, the Supreme Court and many rights that we can hope will eventually come to fruition for Kenyans did result and have created real change.

For my explanation of Raila’s 2007 election, aside from many blog posts categorized and tagged accordingly, see my piece in The Elephant: “The Debacle of 2007: How Kenyan Politics Was Frozen and an Election Stolen With US Connivance.”

Raila’s other legacy is the enduring ODM party itself. The party unfortunately has been in jeopardy in recent years as being without a clear identity with Raila’s handshakes with first Uhuru Kenyatta, then William Ruto. Collaboration with Kenyatta had a clear rationale in achieving Kenyatta’s support for Raila and running mate Martha Karua, intending to stop a Ruto succession. The recent support for Ruto, however, heading into a 2027 re-election campaign, has been hard to square with the notions of the Orange Democratic Movement advertised over the years.

It has been awhile now since Raila was carrying the torch as a reformist leader himself and I will hope that this legacy can now come to greater fruition with younger generations, through a re-tooled ODM and new avenues to compete with ossified elite capture.

See from Africa Report, “Raila Odinga: the man who lost every election but won Kenya’s democracy.”


Condolences to the famiky and their many friends and supporters.

Meanwhile, Michelle Gavin at CFR calls out “accountability gone missing” for Ruto in Kenya

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Accountability gone missing in Kenya

“In the wake of last year’s Gen Z protests, Kenyan President William Ruto had two choices. He could accept the youthful population’s rejection of business as usual and get serious about cleaning up corruption in government, aiming to ride the wave of enthusiasm for change to usher in a new political paradigm based on delivering for voters rather than knitting together a coalition of self-serving elites. Or he could revert to darker days of Kenyan history, using political violence to suppress dissent and cow the public. He chose the latter path.

. . . .

The result is, as the Kenyan Conference of Catholic Bishops put it, an attempt to make everyone complicit in a “culture of lies.” In a statement issued last November, the group lamented, “Basically it seems that truth does not exist, and if it does, it is only what the Government says.” It’s a political scenario that deserves close watching. How does a society that has lost faith in its political class but not necessarily in its own ability to affect change react to obvious untruths coming from official sources, to threats and violence, and to an attempt to distort the very idea of truth? How can Kenyans continue to center the ideas that energized a nationwide movement for change while contending with old attempts to divide them and this latest intentional shirking of responsibility at the very top? The answers will matter a great deal to Kenya’s future, and to the prospects for democracies in peril far beyond Kenya’s borders.”

Ruto made his big career move from the 2008 Post Election Violence and being a target of the failed attempts at accountability. So no right to be surprised.

Old Party Office in Kibera
Solo 7–Kibera

Retrospective thoughts on Ruto in Washington – “Disneyfication”, “clientitus”, UAE concern, and the audacity of hope.

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Foreign Policy Africa Brief:

Ruto’s divisive power. In the Continent, Kiri Rupiah reports on the increasing divide in international and domestic opinion regarding Kenyan President William Ruto, noting the disconnect between the U.S. government’s embrace of Ruto and his low approval ratings at home.

His recent U.S. visit was overshadowed by criticism at home over tax hikes, wasteful expenses, and alleged government corruption. Ruto’s political career began murkily: The International Criminal Court charged him in 2011 with three counts of crimes against humanity related to the ethnic violence that followed Kenya’s 2007 election but later abandoned the case, and Ruto reinvented himself as a key U.S. ally. “In a tradition that changes cast but not much of the script, the US has named its new man in Africa,” Rupiah writes.

The Continent: “Washington completes the Disneyfication of William Ruto; in a tradition that changes cast, but not much of the script, the US has named its new man in Africa” by Kiri Rupiah, p.8

Personally, I am choosing to be hopeful, not that Ruto is not who he has shown himself to be through his participation in election violence and corruption, but rather that greater investment subsidized and supported by the US will help create badly needed jobs for Kenyans.

A visit to Washington this spring identified Ambassador Whittman as being seen in diplomatic circles as having a conspicuous case of “clientitus”.

After returning home, President Ruto admitted at the Prayer Breakfast that he had hitched a ride to Washington on a chartered jet provided by “friends”, who turned out to be the UAE—the same Emiratis who also back the RSF which is committing murder and mayhem in Sudan and melt most of the illicit smuggled gold from the region, along with hosting all sorts of sanction busting and money laundering. But they have a lot of cash to spend around Washington as well as Nairobi and anywhere else that cash is welcome.

I noted that former President Obama seemed to be staying slightly aloof to “Rutofest”, perhaps because of the Post Election Violence background?

And here is former Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson for the United States Institute for Peace: “America’s Vital 21st Century Partnership with Africa—and Kenya’s Key Role”.

Kenya ICC Pawa254

A circle not an arc: Ruto and Biden re-enact Kenyan-American history with a reprise of the Kibaki-Bush State Dinner of 2003

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Kenya 2007 PEV Make Peace Stop Violence

Before the exposure of the Anglo Leasing security sector corruption and other scandals Mwai Kibaki was in quite good books with the Bush Administration in Washington.

Kibaki’s 2002 election victory could be seen at the time as a feather in the cap for Bush’s “freedom agenda” in Africa. Kibaki was a core establishment insider who had served for 10 years as Daniel arap Moi’s vice president during Cold War era single party KANU rule, but had been democratically elected as titular head of a broad “opposition” coalition after the Bush Administration squeezed Moi to honor term limits and allow succession after 24 years and Moi chose his predecessor’s son Uhuru as his intended successor over more senior KANU leaders. (The best of both worlds for us Americans from a strictly diplomatic/foreign relations standpoint.)

Kibaki was used to dealing with the American government going back at least as far as arms purchases during the Gerald Ford Administration with Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State.

A lot has happened since October 2003, but not so much of it has been in Kenya. The biggest single change in Kenya has been population growth (with relatively flat human development). No big fluctuations on corruption or security, etc. and some worsening of an already challenging climate.

Ruto is another first term Kenyan president in very good books in Washington. An establishment protege of Daniel arap Moi who is seen as having had an oppositionist wrinkle to his 2022 election as President as the sitting incumbent Vice President by the fact that the outgoing incumbent President, his erstwhile running mate, Uhuru Kenyatta (also an American favorite while President and close to important Americans before taking office) tried to throw him over for his new “handshake” partner Raila Odinga.

Now, Ruto has a handshake deal of his own to back Odinga for the AU Commission chair as an alternative to domestic Kenyan opposition leadership.

The one big event in Kenya between 2003 and 2024 was Kibaki’s stolen 2007 re-election and the ensuing murder and mayhem as Kenya went “to the brink of civil war”. But as they say, “it’s been a minute”.

And since both the election fraud and the Post Election Violence successfully achieved their objectives it’s hard to find time to remember who was killing whom after so many years.

Externally, the current round of war in Somalia started a little more than two years after Kibaki’s 2003 State Dinner. The Second Kibaki Administration itself invaded Somalia in 2010 and 14 years later the beat goes on. And diplomatically we need Nairobi as a place from which to address any saving of Darfur and democratizing or at least stabilizing Southern/South Sudan as we did back in 2003. A new bonus is the chance to pay to get some of Kenya’s police force out of the country for awhile while also putting African boots on Haitian ground.

I guess the one word that I would choose to fit the Ruto-Biden State Dinner is “predictable”.

See “Disillusion grows in Kenya as Biden hosts Ruto for a historic state visit” in Semafor.

Book bitings: I read Ahmed Isaack Hassan’s memoir from his time at Kenya’s IIEC and IEBC and promised to engage.

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I will do a series of posts here to accompany my agreement to engage with former Chairman Hassan after reading his memoir Referee of a Dirty Ugly Game: In the Theatre of Kenya’s Elections — an Insider’s Account. This is an introduction.

I learned a lot about the Chairman’s personal background, his family, his personal and professional networks, in particular involving his previous political service in unsuccessful constitutional reform endeavors in Mwai Kibaki’s first term, his law practice and work for the UN on Somalia. I learned his personal opinions about several politicians, and many actors in various positions in the Kenyan government and in the Kenyan social and business establishment.

I learned a lot about Ahmed Isaack Hassan, how he sees himself and wants to be seen.

Certainly Hassan has been presented by some who were involved with him in running, presenting and defending the 2013 election as a hero for getting through a process in which power was passed from Kibaki to Kenyatta and Ruto without Kenya “burning”. It is in this context a memoir of this sort fits.

To the extent that this was what Hassan was appointed to do then he did deliver and this is his chance to box his critics. Undoubtedly he was put “through the wringer” to an extreme degree and treated badly in various respects as so many people trying to fulfill positions of public trust are in Kenya and one has to have empathy for the impossible position. Thank God he wasn’t murdered like IT Director Chris Msando from the successor IEBC in 2017.

Unfortunately I did not learn as much as I hoped to about the questions that I raised in this blog and elsewhere about the specifics of the 2013 elections.

I learned that he had and has dismissive and negative opinions of organized civil society generally and people that I worked with to some extent and have liked and admired but I am not very clear why for the most part. Part of it may be that his deference as an insider himself to Kibaki and his establishment executive branch apparatus leads him to have little empathy for a role for outsiders. In particular he evinces no real concern for fraud in the 2007 presidential tally and no moral qualms – as opposed to concerns of international relations – implicated by the question of the participation of candidates in 2013 who were involved in the 2007-08 Post Election Violence.

In particular, the heavily redacted contract materials for IFES from the initial responses to my Freedom of Information Act requests several years ago were much more informative regarding some issues involved in the mechanics of the election and point the way to other sources.

This is the kind of thing that I would be grateful to engage on with the former Chairman.

Of course, ultimately there is a “glass half full or half empty” problem about the 2013 election that will not be fully reconcilable among Kenyans about their own democracy with their own perspectives and interests. On the other hand, for me as an outsider without a “dog in the hunt” directly it seems unequivocal that the glass is partly full of liquid and partly full of air and it is simply a matter of fact to identify what is what even though the significance and value derived from the facts will be a matter of individual judgment for Kenyans.

Sometimes people just have different values and priorities. But maybe 10 years after the fact there is more room for discourse and persuasion than there was in the heat of the struggle.

TO BE CONTINUED. . . .

An Early Warning ignored: “it is possible to infer that a well-orchestrated plan was implemented to ensure a predetermined election result”

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Struck me this week that 15 (!) years had gone by since the July and August release of the International Republican Institute Kenya 2007 Election Observation Mission final report and the Exit Poll following my family’s return to the US from my time in Kenya as Chief of Party on each of those USAID programs.

A quick catch up on-line generated a critical document that I had not noted previously. It is a report prepared by IFES for Open Society East Africa for submission to IREC, popularly known as the “Kreigler Commission” which was to investigate the failed election as a result of the February 28, 2008 “Peace Deal” and subsequent processes to implement the basic terms. The Commission reported privately to President Kibaki and then released a public report (see my key document links) that elided actual investigation of the ECK’s tally of the Presidential vote as such.

Lots of worthwhile material but here is key except, in context of US policy – as I was told by a “player” well after the fact – to back the result of the ECK full stop. Aside from the issue of such a policy making the USAID-funded IRI Election Observation Mission Program and the Exit Poll beside the point at best, it clarifies why the State Department should have known better than to have such a policy—and stick with it in being alone in initially congratulating Kibaki until the violence was raging (aside from the fact that Ambassador Ranneberger himself witnessed fraud in the central ECK tally operation with EU Chief Observation Delegate Lambsdorf as I have demonstrated through obtaining his January 2, 2008 cable to Washington through FOIA).

From “The Electoral Process in Kenya: A Review of Past Experience and Recommendations for Reform” IFES Final Report August 2008:

. . . .

Kenya 2007 election Kibaki Tena Kazi iendelee re-election

Early Warning Signs in Electoral Management

With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to infer that a well-orchestrated plan was
implemented to ensure a predetermined election result:

a. President Kibaki’s decision to abrogate the IPPG agreement of 1997 on the
formula for appointments to the Electoral Commission ensured that all of the
Commissioners were appointed by him alone. The IPPG agreement had capped
the maximum number of Commissioners to 22 and reserved 10 seats to be filled
by persons appointed by the President after recommendations by opposition
parliamentary parties.

b. The allegations of questionable procedure in the appointment of returning
officers by Commissioners.

c. An offer from the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) to install a
computer program that would have enabled election officials in the
constituencies to submit results electronically to Nairobi and then on to a giant
screen available to the public, making it virtually impossible to change results,
was rejected.

d. The use of ECK staff in the Verification and Tallying Center was abandoned in
favor of casual staff recruited directly by the Commissioners.

e. The Commission refused to ensure that election officials in areas with large
predictable majorities for any of the candidates came from different areas so as
to reduce the likelihood of ballot stuffing.

Since opinion polls from the 2007 elections consistently indicated a very tight contest, the
neutrality of the ECK was always paramount, particularly in the event of a thin margin and a
too-close-to-call election. The new appointments made by President Kibaki to the ECK early in
2007 elicited protests from the opposition that he was fortifying the ECK with his supporters
despite the need for the electoral body to be perceived as fair and independent, a perception
crucial to political stability in a region where many political systems are unstable. Several actors
appealed to President Kibaki to consult the opposition prior to making appointments to the
Electoral Commission, with no perceptible effect.

These developments exacerbated problems within the ECK. Although the ECK had improved
substantially since 2002 in its ability to manage elections, the commission still clung to many
questionable practices. For example, votes were counted at the polling station without
transportation to a central tallying center, a process prone to abuse and manipulation by the
former regime. The unilateral appointments by the President meant that the ECK was now
perceived as subject to control, direction, and manipulation by the government.

Uhuru and Raila competed for Ruto’s hand as Deputy in 2012 – it would have been rational for Western diplomatic actors to support a Ruto-Uhuru wedding to inoculate against the type of PEV used in 1992, 1997 and 2007-08.

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Did we do this? I really have no idea factually. Back in 2009 when I attended my first annual meeting of the African Studies Association, in nearby New Orleans that year, I was left with the notion after sitting at the knee of an up-and-coming “scholar/actor” that diplomatic players in the U.S. and/or the U.K. and whomever else might fairly obviously be expected to try to broker a pre-election Kalenjin-Kikuyu coalition.

UhuruRuto Kenya 2013 billboard Nairobi

At the time, the idea of helping put together Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto would have seemed improbably Machiavellian.

Again, as I said, no idea. But if I were to resume taking a look-see into the 2013 election following my initial FOIA request about the IFES program at the IEBC I would be interested to get into the pre-election period as well.

 

Kenya’s election was very close – would Raila have won with Ngilu instead of Karua as running mate?

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Raila Odinga Kenya president campaign

The closeness of the election is somewhat obscured now by the “winner take all” nature of Kenya politics and the quick consolidation of power by Ruto, but it really was very tight under any view. No disrespect to Martha Karua intended because her choice did help revitalize Raila’s campaign when he had persistently trailed in the polls throughout and then moved ahead when she was tapped.

Nonetheless, all politics in Kenya is local/tribal and she was undoubtedly picked in part to try to offset Raila’s weakness versus Ruto in the core Kikuyu old Central Province, as well as a play for “good governance” support from the “international community” and civil society (which had adopted Karua for a variety of reasons in recent years in spite of her understood role as a Kibaki Kikuyu hardliner opposed to the peace deal and power sharing in the 2007-08 ECK and PEV crisis).

At the end of the day, I think Karua was respected but not highly popular, whereas Ngilu was less respected internationally, and perhaps among some parts of Kenya’s more intellectual class, but more popular as a politician.

One thing that I am guessing that happened is that Raila overestimated the practical value of going with a “Good Government” choice in terms of support from Washington and London, and otherwise from “the Western donors”, just as he overestimated the transferability of the support that Kenyatta had in those capitals to him. I think he just may have been behind the times on this: there were years when Ruto or a candidate with his profile would have drawn active criticism internationally for corruption but 2022 was just not such a year for a variety of reasons. Likewise people in Washington that considered Ruto “dangerous” as late as a couple of years ago because of his role in the PEV seem to have gotten over it once they saw him as the long-established frontrunner in the polls and BBI not catching on. I think many were unsure whether Kenyatta was really going to follow through on supporting Raila which made it that much easier to rationalize a Ruto presidency.

“On the ground” among Kenyan voters, Raila could not pull off running a traditional opposition anti-corruption oriented campaign after several years of the handshake and clearly counting on Kenyatta’s support. Too much cognitive dissonance, especially after getting beat in the Courts on a BBI that got larded up and bogged down to the point of becoming notably unpopular in its own right. On that front, the Karua pick seems to have proven too late and too out of step with the messaging from Raila’s other coalition heavyweights.

Given that he was behind in the polls and needed a spark, I do think choosing a woman made sense, but Ngilu as a more traditional Kenyan politician who was a current office holder and a long established vote getter from a “swing” region and ethnicity might have fit the bill quite a bit better. A more obvious choice to match up versus Mudavadi and Wetagula on Ruto’s side and a more congruous fit with the rest the established heavyweights on the Azimio team.

“A Few Thoughts on the Kenyan Election”

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A Kenyan friend recently checked in to ask what I had written about the Kenyan election. I had to say “very little”. I have been committed to my more unique role as a witness to what went wrong in 2007-08 and tried to avoid the risk of being just another opinionated outsider missing the real conduct and motivations of the opaque competition for power through the election.

Nonetheless, I did send a private email memo to a few friends in Kenya and Washington back on May 15, 2022 (shortly before Raila and Ruto chose running mates) titled “A Few Thoughts on the Kenyan Election”:

1. First big election in Africa after the end of the Post-Cold War peace in Europe.

2. In this environment, the democratic Western players are less able to credibly claim to speak for a notional international community.

3. So on balance, not much reason to indulge Kenyatta now the way we did Kibaki in 2007. Unless we can be sure that the Kenyattas have a deal with Ruto to assure no major violence, why would we signal that we would be willing to look the other way if they steal it for Raila? Major violence would be riskier and more unpredictable now than back in 2007. On the other hand, if they do steal it, the last thing we would want to do is risk instabilty on behalf of a few votes for Wm. Ruto.

4. Obviously Obama and Trump and their administrations overestimated Uhuru for 15 years, but if we really cared about the details of Kenyan politics we would have gotten serious about injecting some competence into Kenyatta’s BBI fiasco.

5. There are still a few weeks left in a 4 1/2 year campaign so Raila could get it together, but who really thinks that’s highly likely? Under the circumstances, it isn’t that hard to see why ordinary Kenyans would be attracted to a candidate who is even more corrupt and more ruthlessly ambitious, but presents as having some basic discipline and competence, among the actual choices. Especially if you have lived through recent American elections.

6. The American humorist Will Rogers (from the era of my grandparents on the small family farm in Kansas during the Great Depression) was famous for the phrase: “I never met a man I didn’t like”. We have never met a President of Kenya we didn’t like.

UhuruRuto Kenya 2013 billboard Nairobi

Just my honest, private thoughts at the time, for what it is worth.

In 2007-08, I only met Moi and Ruto once each. Loose impressions:

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To me, Daniel arap Moi in person seemed more like Raila (and I am guessing Uhuru, whom I never met). A more relaxed demeanor reflecting longevity in the game presumably. At that time, in July 2007, Moi seemed to be trying to stay relevant politically. (Shortly after I met him the deal was cut whereby Moi and KANU, led nominally by Uhuru, crossed over from leading “the official opposition” to supporting Kibaki’s re-election and Moi was appointed by Kibaki as Envoy to Sudan).

Ruto was conspicuously more telegenic and articulate. Thus his natural role in squaring off against Kibaki’s Justice Minister Martha Karua at the Electoral Commission (ECK) Headquarters on television at the Kenyatta International Conference Center (KICC) during the tally in the days following December 27, 2007 election (until the Kibaki Government through Interior Minister John Michuki shut off the live broadcasting). Even though Ruto wasn’t a lawyer.

The surprising thing to me when I introduced myself briefly to Ruto was how different he came across in person than on television. A person of much more intense physical presence than a typical politician like Moi or Raila, Kalonzo, Mudavadi or others I met.

This impression lends itself to a question: is Ruto a typical Kenyan politician, or is he a telegenic but more especially dangerous person who has simply been normalized by pundits and diplomats because he acquired power by virtue of a “coalition of accused kingpins of violence” with Uhuru Kenyatta during the failed ICC prosecutions for the 2007-08 Post Election Violence (PEV)?

Or was Ruto simply normal in his relation to political violence and wrongly tagged as more responsible than other Kalenjin politicians, such that the opportunistic political gain from being indicted by the ICC is just one more common facet of democratic competition. So that in the environment of total agreed impunity of the political class for the murder and mayhem of 2007-08 Ruto has simply the normal association with violence so that his qualities of telegenic articulation can be credited positively rather than treated with suspicion?

Or is it, to the contrary, plausible to see him as something something else entirely, a fresh candidate now, breaking the mold of Kenyan politics not by virtue of having been an especially dangerous protagonist of ethnic violence, but by becoming the first real reformist to win by moving Kenya beyond ethnicity on a platform of better economic policy? Or a fresh candidate breaking breaking the mold in some other way?

Some of this depends on whether one sees continuity between the actions and history of politicians from one campaign cycle to the next, or whether it is tacitly agreed that democracy means every candidate should get a clean slate to be whatever they want to be in each particular campaign.

(Note that none of these questions are intended to comment in any detail about other comparisons between Ruto and his rivals or examine the track record of those rivals, each of whom have their own controversies even if they are easier to group together more generally.)

UhuruRuto Kenya 2013 billboard Nairobi