Two more breakthroughs on documenting the fraud in Kibaki’s 2007 re-election (the War for History part 21)

The recent feature “Stolen Ballot: Inside the bitter 2007 presidential election heist” from Kenya’s leading commercial television broadcaster NTV features some of the people directly involved in the logistics of delivering that announcement of “results” of the election by Electoral Commission of Kenya chairman Samuel Kivuitu through the state broadcaster KBC even though we have documented from my #FOIA research that Kivuitu had not wanted to do so. [Not that it wasn’t obvious on live television in Kenya in real time that Kivuitu was alarmed by what was going on with the submission of the results before the Minister of Internal Security John Michuki shut down live broadcasting.]

is the story of some of the people the late Kivuitu said “should not have been born” in his first press availability from his back yard during early stages of the Post Election Violence following the swearing in when he said that he did not know who had won in spite of making the announcement and providing the certificate for Kibaki’s twilight swearing in at State House.

It describes an operation from State House to strong arm Kivuitu with confessional testimony of some of those directly involved.

This dovetails with my previous reporting that I was told by a diplomat that his country had learned that Returning Agents had been paid “life changing amounts of money” to turn off their phones and drop out of contact with Kivuitu’s IEBC headquarters to allow the results in their constituencies to be “marked up” for Kibaki.

https://youtu.be/7YBoYS-VHDc?si=d5apA_jAtDrTAkX8

Last year Martha Karua, Kibaki’s Justice Minister during the 2007 election and leader of Kibaki’s mediation team during the failed mediation published her memoir “Against the Tide”revealing that during her visit to Kenya in support of the negotiations US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Kibaki to his face that “You know Mr. President, you never won.”

Reading the Kenya material in the DOJ’s response to date to Congressionally mandated Epstein file release

A lot to come to grips with in terms of Kenya’s role as a playground for international elites, often pretending to do “philanthropy” while playing, investing and intriguing.

Back in 2019 I took note of the situation but I did not anticipate then that someday the Justice Department would release perhaps half their records seized from and related to Epstein;

For example –

From: Sultan Bin Sulayem

Sent: Friday, October 24, 2014 10:41 PM

To: Jeffrey Epstein

Subject: Kenya

Attachments: IMG_6878.1PG; Untitled attachment 00010.txt; IMG_6879JPG; Untitled attachment

00013.txt; IMG_6880JPG; Untitled attachment 00016.txt

I am in Mombasa had a three hour meeting with president Uhuru Kenyata we ar= going to build a big logistic park to

serve Kenya south Sudan Uganda centr=l African republic and Rawanda Sultan

————/

To: jeevacationeNmaitcom[jeevacation©gmail.com]

Cc:

From: Peggy Siegal

Sent Mon 5/11/2009 9:32:50 PM

Subject: Kenya

Title: Kenya

As Paula just mentioned • the girls not only showed up for the conference call• but are now totally excited about going.

Sandy Cunningham knows exactly what to do and is giving the girls a few choices…but has them interning all over

Africa. Our luck, they will bring home Masai warriors…

We arc all kissing the ground you walk on and the African plains the girls arc about to ride on.

xoxo Peggy

——/

From: Lauren C <

Sent: Monday, April 24, 2017 1:32 PM

To: Soon-Yi Previn

Cc: Jeffrey Epstein

Subject: Bechet’s Habitat for Humanity Trip

Hi,

Bechet’s trip will start in Nairobi, Kenya (that’s where they will fly into.) She will then go to =b class=””>Homa Bay,

Kenya, the town they will be building in. A =escription from Google: Homa Bay is bay and town on the south shore of Winam Gulf of Lake Victoria, in western Kenya. The mayor of Homa Bay city is Veronica Achieng’ ohana.

Itinerary

• Day 1, welcome: Fly into Nairobi, Kenya, where Habitat for Humanity staff will pick you up at the airport. Meet your team over dinner.

• Day 2, Orientation: Habitat staff will introduce you to their sophisticated work across Kenya, which includes microloans and health programs in addition to building. Travel to your host community near Homa Bay.

• Days =-6, Build: Build new houses or housing repairs. One day will include a cultural activity, such as a tour, cooking lesson or visit to a natural site. At night, reflect with your team and enjoy free time.

• Day 7, Celebrate: Build, then wrap up =onstruction at a farewell celebration with your partner family and neighbors.

• Day 8, Reflect: Drive back to Nairobi. At the final team dinner, reflect on your experience and what it means.

• Day 9, Goodbyes: depart for home or independently continue your travel in Africa.

Lauren

Lauren Cheung

Assistant to Woody Allen

MANHATTAN FILM CENTER

575 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10065

———-/

From: Lesley Groff

To: Darren Indyke

Subject: Jeffrey’s 2nd Passport

Date: Wed, 01 May 2013 16:56:07 +0000

Attachments: Scan_14.pdf

Jeffrey wants his 2nd passport renewed…he responded with below:

kenya, south africa, china june 1- 30

I am having an itinerary made with Amex to Nairobi, Kenya on June 1, Cape Town, South Africa on June 11 and on to Beijing, China on June 18, back to NY arriving June 29(sound good!?)

I am also filling out other forms that need to be signed by JE…can you please tweak the below letter so it will represent what JE is and what company he is president of and etc. with the towns and dates I have provided?

How many X accounts and subscriptions does the United States Government pay for?

Let’s ask President Trump to direct DOGE, which we are now told via court filing, he runs in lieu of Elon Musk, to investigate?

A good piece explaining “Why Kenya’s protests are different this time”.

Happy Saba Saba Day.

A range of Kenyan voices have been saying that the current “Gen Z” protest movement has already generated an irrevocable shift in Kenyan politics and/or even Kenyan society.

I suspect that veteran professional “Kenya watchers” and analysts in interested foreign capitols are not yet sure about that.

Here is a good piece in The Conversation by Owino Okech at SOAS that I find useful in assessing the durability of the movement:Kenya’s protests are different this time: 3 things that make it harder for government to crush them.”

“A Few Thoughts on the Kenyan Election”

A Kenyan friend recently checked in to ask what I had written about the Kenyan election. I had to say “very little”. I have been committed to my more unique role as a witness to what went wrong in 2007-08 and tried to avoid the risk of being just another opinionated outsider missing the real conduct and motivations of the opaque competition for power through the election.

Nonetheless, I did send a private email memo to a few friends in Kenya and Washington back on May 15, 2022 (shortly before Raila and Ruto chose running mates) titled “A Few Thoughts on the Kenyan Election”:

1. First big election in Africa after the end of the Post-Cold War peace in Europe.

2. In this environment, the democratic Western players are less able to credibly claim to speak for a notional international community.

3. So on balance, not much reason to indulge Kenyatta now the way we did Kibaki in 2007. Unless we can be sure that the Kenyattas have a deal with Ruto to assure no major violence, why would we signal that we would be willing to look the other way if they steal it for Raila? Major violence would be riskier and more unpredictable now than back in 2007. On the other hand, if they do steal it, the last thing we would want to do is risk instabilty on behalf of a few votes for Wm. Ruto.

4. Obviously Obama and Trump and their administrations overestimated Uhuru for 15 years, but if we really cared about the details of Kenyan politics we would have gotten serious about injecting some competence into Kenyatta’s BBI fiasco.

5. There are still a few weeks left in a 4 1/2 year campaign so Raila could get it together, but who really thinks that’s highly likely? Under the circumstances, it isn’t that hard to see why ordinary Kenyans would be attracted to a candidate who is even more corrupt and more ruthlessly ambitious, but presents as having some basic discipline and competence, among the actual choices. Especially if you have lived through recent American elections.

6. The American humorist Will Rogers (from the era of my grandparents on the small family farm in Kansas during the Great Depression) was famous for the phrase: “I never met a man I didn’t like”. We have never met a President of Kenya we didn’t like.

UhuruRuto Kenya 2013 billboard Nairobi

Just my honest, private thoughts at the time, for what it is worth.

As preparations for Kenya’s elections lag once again, cut the fog of time and remember what happened in 2007

Polling Station Olympic School Kibera

Flashback to the night of Kibaki’s twilight swearing in . . .

“Kenya could be facing its greatest crisis”, The Telegraph

Analysis

Five years ago yesterday, close to a million people watched as Mwai Kibaki was inaugurated as President of Kenya in Nairobi’s Uhuru Park.

Daniel Arap Moi, the authoritarian strongman who had ruled for a quarter of a century, was gone, his hand-picked successor roundly defeated.

A nation rejoiced. Already one of Africa’s most stable countries, Kenya could also now claim to be among its most democratic.

Last night, Mr Kibaki was hurriedly sworn in before a few hundred loyalists at a tawdry ceremony held in the gardens of the official presidential residence.

The contrast could not have been more stark.

As he lumbered towards the podium, Kenya’s cities and towns were erupting in chaos and ethnically motivated bloodshed, a predictable response after the most dubious election since the one-party era ended in 1992.

It is no exaggeration to say that Kenya is potentially facing its most serious crisis since gaining independence from Britain in 1963.

The prospect for serious violence between the country’s two most traditionally antagonistic tribes, Mr Kibaki’s Kikuyu and the Luo, led by his challenger Raila Odinga, is worryingly high.

Luos, marginalised since independence, have reason to feel aggrieved. Thanks to an alliance that Mr Odinga built with other tribes, they felt that this was their best and possibly last chance of taking power.

The farcical nature of the vote will only heighten their disappointment. The electoral commission initially claimed that roughly a quarter of returning officers disappeared for 36 hours without announcing results and had switched off their mobile phones.

When results did finally emerge, Mr Odinga saw a one million vote lead overturned.

Opinion polls showed that the contest was always going to be close, but if the official results are correct, Kenyans voted in an inexplicably bizarre manner.

After turfing out 20 of Mr Kibaki’s cabinet ministers and reducing his party to a rump in the simultaneous parliamentary poll, they apparently voted in an entirely different manner in the presidential race.

Apart from an unusually high turn-out in some of Mr Kibaki’s strongholds (sometimes more than 100 per cent ), the president then appeared to have won many more votes in some constituencies than first reported.

If it all seems depressingly familiar, it need not have been.

Mr Kibaki had lost a lot of the enormous goodwill that he enjoyed following the 2002 election after a cabal of Kikuyu cronies was accused of corruption. He also reneged on a promise to introduce a new constitution that would have returned many of his overarching powers to parliament.

On the other hand, he allowed a free press to thrive and respected the results of a 2005 referendum that went against him. Many expected he would do the same if he lost last Thursday’s election.

Instead of setting an example to the rest of the continent, Mr Kibaki’s opponents say that he has joined the unholy pantheon of African presidents who have refused to surrender power.

If he has chosen instead to squander his country’s stability and its fragile ethnic harmony it is a tragedy not just for Kenya but for all of Africa.

Reporting keeps digging deeper on US decision to “look away” from stolen DRCongo election

The latest breakthrough is from Stephen R. Weissman in Foreign Policy this week: “Why did Washington let a stolen election stand in the Congo?“. Weissman gets significantly more detail than the previous stories have accumulated on the Catholic church organized and U.S. subsidized “parallel vote tabulation”:

This account is based primarily on 20 interviews—including 10 with U.S. officials—that were conducted on background and without attribution to promote candor. Foreign Policy offered the U.S. State Department the opportunity to comment on passages stemming from interviews with U.S. officials, but it declined.

In a Jan. 3, 2019 press statement, the State Department urged CENI to transparently count votes and “ensure” its results “correspond to results announced at each of DRC’s 75,000 polling stations.” At the same time, the department ignored the one resource that could have held the Kabila-dominated, corruption-laden CENI to account: the church’s U.S.-funded election observation project.

Weissman has delivered the type of detailed story that I had always hoped to see some enterprising journalist write about the decision to “look away” from election fraud in Kenya in 2007–in particular what I hoped the New York Times was in the process of reporting in 2008 when I was interviewed about the “spiked” exit poll indicating an opposition win. The DRC is not a close U.S. ally and regional center for the “international community” in the same way that Kenya is, so perhaps the DRC is a more realistic venue for a tougher examination of mixed messages and mixed motives. Also, because violence did not explode in DRC in 2019 it is easier for officials involved to talk to reporters (without personal attribution) about the decision making process.

The next step for reporters who are interested would obviously be to pursue the documentary record.

Regardless, the paradigm is the same in terms of the choices between “diplomacy” and transparency in election assistance and election observation.

Lake lodge Uganda Rwanda Congo

Essential: JOHN GITHONGO – Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: The Choices Facing Kenya and the Kenyattas | The Elephant

JOHN GITHONGO – Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: The Choices Facing Kenya and the Kenyattas | The Elephant
— Read on www.theelephant.info/features/2021/04/23/between-the-devil-and-the-deep-blue-sea-the-choices-facing-kenya-and-the-kenyattas/

New report that Trump Administration learned of staggering procurement corruption at top of DRC’s Election Commission “a few weeks before” 2018 election, stayed mum

In a must read story of “Africa in DC”, Buzzfeed’s Albert Samaha peels back several layers of the story of how DRC strongman Joseph Kabila managed his 2016-19 election problem with the new Trump Administration: “A Secretive Company Needed to Convince Washington That Congo’s Election Would Be “Free and Fair.” It Found A Friendly Ear Among Trump Allies.

Previous reporting disclosed internal dissent within the State Department, including an early 2019 story from Robbie Graemer and Jeffcoate O’Donnell I noted here: “Foreign Policy article gives insight on disagreements within Trump Administration on backing off on criticism of flawed DRC vote.”

Kabila’s innovation was to turn directly to his Israeli surveillance and security contractors to broker the hiring of lobbyists connected to the Trump Administration, such as Robert Stryk’s Sonoran Policy Group who repped the Kenyatta-Ruto Administration in Washington during its 2017 re-election effort. Kenyatta hired Stryk through the Kenyan foreign ministry rather than through surveillance contractors. One could suggest that the use of outside-the-Beltway intermediaries raised eyebrows and ultimately loosened tongues.

Update: Here is a link to the U.S. Foreign Agent Registration Act filing of Mer Security and Communications, Ltd of Halon, Israel for the Government of the DRC for the 2018 election. And the filing of Stryk’s Sonoran Policy Group for their subcontracted portion, including lobbying the National Security Council, and hosting “the Cobalt Reception”. (Further on Sonoran Group, see “Trump-linked lobbyist turns from Gulf Arabs to more toxic clients,” al-Monitor, Feb. 19, 2020.)

You owe it to yourself to read Samaha’s whole story, but the thing that is most profoundly disappointing to me is the report that my government learned about massive corruption at the CENI in time to say something before the vote but elected not to.

This casts new color to the internal debate within the U.S. government over what to say and do, and what to disclose, when CENI subsequently announced “results” that lacked credibility.

The excuse for not speaking to government-sponsored election fraud is supposedly the fear of instability from aggrieved voters faced with intransigent incumbents—a real concern—but how can we claim to be serious about democracy support when we chose to keep quite on obviously debilitating fraud before the vote? A key question for me about the Kenyan election disaster in 2007 has always been how much we knew about Kibaki’s intentions before the election, having documented through FOIA that Ambassador Ranneberger personally witnessed the wrongful changing of tallies at the Kenyan IEBC but still encouraged Kenyans to accept the vote without disclosure.

Update: Assistant Secretary of State Tibor Nagy appears to have effectively announced the “climb down” by the State Department on supporting Tshisekedi as the de facto president at a CSIS dinner in Washington on January 30, 2019, while still asserting “In addition, we will continue to voice our disapproval of the poor implementation of a flawed electoral process, which was far below the standards of a fully democratic process. We will hold accountable those most responsible for undermining D.R.C.’s democratic processes and institutions.” Nagy celebrated a peaceful transition of power “that few thought possible”. “Ultimately, the Congolese people have the final word. After President Kabila left office, there have been no meaningful protests to the election outcome. Felix Tshisekedi has vowed to unite the country, reform the security forces and justice sector, fight corruption, and spur greater U.S. investment and it is in our interest to help him succeed.”

On March 21, 2019 the Treasury Department announced personal sanctions against the two top officials of CENI:

Under Nangaa’s leadership, CENI officials inflated by as much as $100 million the costs for the electronic voting machine contract with the intent to use surplus funds for personal enrichment, bribes, and campaign costs to fund the election campaign of Kabila’s candidate. Nangaa, with other CENI officials, awarded an election-related contract and doubled the award amount on the understanding that the winning company would award the extra funds to a DRC company controlled by CENI leadership. Nangaa approved the withdrawal of CENI operation funds for non-authorized budget items for personal use by DRC government employees. Nangaa ordered CENI employees to fabricate expense receipts to cover spending gaps resulting from CENI funds being used for personal gain. Nangaa delivered bribes to Constitutional Court justices to uphold a decision by the CENI to delay DRC’s 2016 elections.

Consider in light of the ultimately similar context from Kabila’s alleged 2011 “re-election” during Secretary Clinton’s State Department tenure as I warned about in a post here on August 8, 2018: “With DRC’s Kabila Backing a Substitute Candidate This Year, Time to Review the International Observation Experience from 2011 Vote”:

At the time of the last election in 2011, Africa democratizers were buoyed by an understood success story in Ghana, the hope of an “Arab Spring”, the lull of violence in Iraq and more generally encouraging environment. As explained in my posts from that time, the U.S.- funded International Observation Mission (conducted by the Carter Center) found the election to fall short of adequacy by the applicable international standards and said so explicitly.

Initially standing up to Kabila over the failures of his alleged re-election and pushing for them to be addressed appeared to be U.S. policy. If so, we apparently changed our mind for some reason. Tolerating a bad election then leaves us in a more difficult position with seven years of water under that bridge. The U.S. has stepped up recently to pressure Kabila to schedule the election, allow opposition and stand down himself.

In this vein, we need to be careful, and transparent, as things proceed to continue to evaluate realistically what is feasible and where we are really able and willing to assist.  In particular, the decision to initiate and fund one or more Election Observation Missions for a vote in these circumstances should involve serious soul-searching at the State Department (and/or USAID).

On the last election:

DRC: “We have to debunk the idea that it is peace versus transparent elections. The idea that lousy elections are going to bring piece is madness.”

Carter Center calls it as they see it in DRC

U.S. and other Western donors support review of election irregularities in DRC — offer technical assistance

State Department to Kabila on DRC Presidential Election: “Nevermind”?

Catch latest AfriCOG report on State Capture online tomorrow—“Highway Robbery”

On Thursday 12th November at 2pm EAT, AfriCOG will be launching its latest report on state capture – Highway Robbery. Budgeting for State Capture: A case study of infrastructure spending under the Jubilee Administration.

Meeting Details:
Access Link:
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/87889507376
Webinar ID: 878 8950 7376
International numbers available: https://us02web.zoom.us/u/kcI3GL4ylM
Thursday 12th Nov, 2pm EAT

Agenda

  • Opening Welcome & Intro: Gladwell Otieno, AfriCOG Executive Director (Moderator)
  • Report Findings: David Ndii, Economist
  • Guest Speaker: Jerotich Seii, Energy Sector and Social Justice Activist #SwitchOffKPLC
  • Q&A and Discussion: Open Forum
  • Closing Remarks: Gladwell Otieno 

Former Auditor General Edward Ouko, speaking at the launch of AfriCOG’s first “State Capture” report spoke of a phenomenon he referred to as “budgeted corruption,” through which government budgets are inflated by monies that are earmarked to be stolen. Ouko characterised the budgeting process as a “highway”, and such projects as “exit lanes”.

With the “Highway Robbery” study, we set out to test the hypothesis that the runaway corruption during the Jubilee administration is evidence of “budgeted corruption”, which is in turn a manifestation of state capture. Budgets and expenditure in three key infrastructure sectors, electricity, roads and water are examined to see the extent to which there is systematic deviation of project choice from PFM value for money norms, and whether that divergence can be construed to be “exit lanes” for budgeted corruption as postulated by the former Auditor General.

AfriCOG’s hope is that this latest study will contribute to the continuing exposure and naming of the structures and operations of state capture, which seem to obviate the conventional reform strategies that civil society has been advocating. Our aim is for citizens to understand that while democracy is the only protection against capture by special interests, at the same time, democracy is fragile, tenuous and must be defended, deepened and imbued with real meaning by a vigilant and enlightened public.

We very much look forward to your attendance. For further information, contact admin@africog.org

Kind regards,
Gladwell Otieno
Executive Director
Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCOG)