By switching Deputy Presidents from Rigathi Gachagua to Kithure Kindiki, William Ruto has strengthened his position to avoid a serious challenge to a second term from 2027.
Prior to the 2010 reform Constitution resulting from the 2008 “Peace Deal” and National Accord as a consequence of the Post Election Violence from Mwai Kibaki’s rigged re-election, Kenya had Vice Presidents who were understood to serve at the President’s pleasure.
This was a core feature of one-party KANU rule under Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi. Mwai Kibaki himself served as Moi’s initial Vice President in 1978 and continued in office as one-party KANU rule moved from de facto to de jure. In 1988 he was precipitously demoted by Moi.
After the Kibaki-controlled Election Commission of Kenya gave a re-election certificate to Kibaki and his dusk swearing in that evening of December 30, 2007, Kibaki appointed “third party” (ODM-K) presidential candidate Kalonzo Musyoka as his new Vice President (Kenya’s 10th) and Minister of Home Affairs on January 8 as the country was engulfed in violence by Kibaki’s security forces, by organized ethnic militias and spontaneously. The Musyoka V.P. appointment accompanied a “Half Cabinet” that included key Kibaki supporters such as Uhuru Kenyatta.
The sitting Vice President from Kibaki’s re-election, Moody Awori, was more or less ignored.
During Kibaki’s second term, with the rest of the Cabinet filled out under the National Accord, Musyoka as Vice President had ambiguous status relative to the new Prime Minister, Raila Odinga.
When the final version of the proposed new constitution emerged from the backroom negotiations at Naivasha between the factions in the so-called Government of National Unity, the positions of Prime Minister and Vice President were eliminated in favor of a Deputy President. William Ruto was the primary leader of opposition to the new draft constitution in the 2010 referendum but carried only his core ethnic base and lost by a landslide nationwide.
A range of Kenyan voices have been saying that the current “Gen Z” protest movement has already generated an irrevocable shift in Kenyan politics and/or even Kenyan society.
I suspect that veteran professional “Kenya watchers” and analysts in interested foreign capitols are not yet sure about that.
At this point we have today seen passage of the Ruto Finance Bill on third reading in Parliament, breach of Parliament by protesters and the shooting deaths of several by Kenya’s police. Lots of teargas, attempts to intimidate media, and an apparent major internet slowdown. Fires at Nairobi city hall and at least some other seats of County Governments and homes of Government-supporting MPs as protesters are on the streets or more in most counties.
Finally a joint statement from most of the Western embassies and one from Raila Odinga after extraordinary silence.
When the US misplayed the 2007 elections and crisis erupted, we were then able to step up diplomatically to help ameliorate the crisis. This is more challenging because the embrace of Ruto by rookie Ambassador Whitman and the subsequent love fest in Washington. Terrible timing whether completely coincidental or not. Washington seems to have picked a very bad time to forget what we called for years “the reform agenda”.
The protests had been peaceful in spite of police abuse until now, but seem to be in uncharted territory with some direct action including arson against targeted property and vandalism of ambulances and other conduct that is of a very different character. How much support is there to actually try to overthrow the government in the streets versus on X? I don’t know but I hope that people who are on salary from my tax dollars to manage the US – Kenyan relationship do.
Update: see attached copy of statement from 13 democratic embassies (including US) and Gazette notice from Cabinet Secretary for Defense Aden Duale purportedly authorizing deployment of Kenya’s military in response to “security emergency” caused by “violent protests . . . resulting in destruction and breaching of critical infrastructure”. The Kenyan constitution places this power of domestic emergency military deployment with Parliament, not with the individual Cabinet Secretary.
And Ruto has given a combative and unapologetic 9:00pm local time address – seems assured to drive crisis versus de-escalation.
Ruto’s divisive power. In the Continent, Kiri Rupiah reports on the increasing divide in international and domestic opinion regarding Kenyan President William Ruto, noting the disconnect between the U.S. government’s embrace of Ruto and his low approval ratings at home.
His recent U.S. visit was overshadowed by criticism at home over tax hikes, wasteful expenses, and alleged government corruption. Ruto’s political career began murkily: The International Criminal Court charged him in 2011 with three counts of crimes against humanity related to the ethnic violence that followed Kenya’s 2007 election but later abandoned the case, and Ruto reinvented himself as a key U.S. ally. “In a tradition that changes cast but not much of the script, the US has named its new man in Africa,” Rupiah writes.
Personally, I am choosing to be hopeful, not that Ruto is not who he has shown himself to be through his participation in election violence and corruption, but rather that greater investment subsidized and supported by the US will help create badly needed jobs for Kenyans.
A visit to Washington this spring identified Ambassador Whittman as being seen in diplomatic circles as having a conspicuous case of “clientitus”.
After returning home, President Ruto admitted at the Prayer Breakfast that he had hitched a ride to Washington on a chartered jet provided by “friends”, who turned out to be the UAE—the same Emiratis who also back the RSF which is committing murder and mayhem in Sudan and melt most of the illicit smuggled gold from the region, along with hosting all sorts of sanction busting and money laundering. But they have a lot of cash to spend around Washington as well as Nairobi and anywhere else that cash is welcome.
I noted that former President Obama seemed to be staying slightly aloof to “Rutofest”, perhaps because of the Post Election Violence background?
Various media reports from Washington indicate that the U.S. will accord Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status to Kenya during the current state visit by William Ruto.
A fact sheet from the State Department’s Bureau of Political and Military Affairs copied below outlines the legal framework:
Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status is a designation under U.S. law [1] that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation. The Major Non-NATO Ally designation is a powerful symbol of the close relationship the United States shares with those countries and demonstrates our deep respect for the friendship for the countries to which it is extended. While MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments to the designated country.
Eligible for loans of material, supplies, or equipment for cooperative research, development, testing, or evaluation purposes.
Eligible as a location for U.S.-owned War Reserve Stockpiles to be placed on its territory outside of U.S. military facilities.
Can enter into agreements with the United States for the cooperative furnishing of training on a bilateral or multilateral basis, if the financial arrangements are reciprocal and provide for reimbursement of all U.S. direct costs.
Eligible, to the maximum extent feasible, for priority delivery of Excess Defense Articles transferred under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act (if located on the southern or south-eastern flank of NATO).
Eligible for consideration to purchase depleted uranium ammunition.
Privileges resulting from MNNA designation under 10U.S.C. §2350a :
Eligible to enter into an MOU or other formal agreement with the U.S. Department of Defense for the purpose of conducting cooperative research and development projects on defense equipment and munitions.
Allows firms of a MNNA, as with NATO countries, to bid on contracts for maintenance, repair or overhaul of U.S. Department of Defense equipment outside the United States.
Allows funding to procure explosives detection devices and other counter-terrorism research and development projects under the auspices of the Department of State’s Technical Support Working Group .
Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, South Korea, Thailand, and Tunisia.
In addition, Pub. L. 107–228 provides Taiwan shall be treated as an MNNA, without formal designation as such.
So Kenya will be the first country in “Sub-Saharan Africa” with such designation and will join Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco on the Continent and Tunisia and Morocco within the AFRICOM Area of Operations.
I do not know that this will generate a great deal of additional defense trade activity soon, but I do think it will help cement Kenya’s profile in Washington generally and within Congress and further solidify Kenya’s status as “America’s favorite African country” for purposes of all sorts of economic, development and diplomatic endeavors and Nairobi’s status as the city of choice for the US as it is for the UN.
The objective for the United States should be to maximize the pursuit of genuine shared interests with Kenya without personalizing the relationship. Ruto and his allies have deftly countered existing and potential political threats at home while vociferously criticizing judicial decisions that do not go their way. A potential Kenyan trajectory in which Ruto faces no serious challenges or checks while the broader population becomes increasingly disaffected is bad news for Kenya, bad for U.S. interests, and bad for democracy.”
Before the exposure of the Anglo Leasing security sector corruption and other scandals Mwai Kibaki was in quite good books with the Bush Administration in Washington.
Kibaki’s 2002 election victory could be seen at the time as a feather in the cap for Bush’s “freedom agenda” in Africa. Kibaki was a core establishment insider who had served for 10 years as Daniel arap Moi’s vice president during Cold War era single party KANU rule, but had been democratically elected as titular head of a broad “opposition” coalition after the Bush Administration squeezed Moi to honor term limits and allow succession after 24 years and Moi chose his predecessor’s son Uhuru as his intended successor over more senior KANU leaders. (The best of both worlds for us Americans from a strictly diplomatic/foreign relations standpoint.)
Kibaki was used to dealing with the American government going back at least as far as arms purchases during the Gerald Ford Administration with Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State.
A lot has happened since October 2003, but not so much of it has been in Kenya. The biggest single change in Kenya has been population growth (with relatively flat human development). No big fluctuations on corruption or security, etc. and some worsening of an already challenging climate.
Ruto is another first term Kenyan president in very good books in Washington. An establishment protege of Daniel arap Moi who is seen as having had an oppositionist wrinkle to his 2022 election as President as the sitting incumbent Vice President by the fact that the outgoing incumbent President, his erstwhile running mate, Uhuru Kenyatta (also an American favorite while President and close to important Americans before taking office) tried to throw him over for his new “handshake” partner Raila Odinga.
Now, Ruto has a handshake deal of his own to back Odinga for the AU Commission chair as an alternative to domestic Kenyan opposition leadership.
The one big event in Kenya between 2003 and 2024 was Kibaki’s stolen 2007 re-election and the ensuing murder and mayhem as Kenya went “to the brink of civil war”. But as they say, “it’s been a minute”.
And since both the election fraud and the Post Election Violence successfully achieved their objectives it’s hard to find time to remember who was killing whom after so many years.
Externally, the current round of war in Somalia started a little more than two years after Kibaki’s 2003 State Dinner. The Second Kibaki Administration itself invaded Somalia in 2010 and 14 years later the beat goes on. And diplomatically we need Nairobi as a place from which to address any saving of Darfur and democratizing or at least stabilizing Southern/South Sudan as we did back in 2003. A new bonus is the chance to pay to get some of Kenya’s police force out of the country for awhile while also putting African boots on Haitian ground.
I guess the one word that I would choose to fit the Ruto-Biden State Dinner is “predictable”.
I will do a series of posts here to accompany my agreement to engage with former Chairman Hassan after reading his memoir Referee of a Dirty Ugly Game: In the Theatre of Kenya’s Elections — an Insider’s Account. This is an introduction.
I learned a lot about the Chairman’s personal background, his family, his personal and professional networks, in particular involving his previous political service in unsuccessful constitutional reform endeavors in Mwai Kibaki’s first term, his law practice and work for the UN on Somalia. I learned his personal opinions about several politicians, and many actors in various positions in the Kenyan government and in the Kenyan social and business establishment.
I learned a lot about Ahmed Isaack Hassan, how he sees himself and wants to be seen.
Certainly Hassan has been presented by some who were involved with him in running, presenting and defending the 2013 election as a hero for getting through a process in which power was passed from Kibaki to Kenyatta and Ruto without Kenya “burning”. It is in this context a memoir of this sort fits.
To the extent that this was what Hassan was appointed to do then he did deliver and this is his chance to box his critics. Undoubtedly he was put “through the wringer” to an extreme degree and treated badly in various respects as so many people trying to fulfill positions of public trust are in Kenya and one has to have empathy for the impossible position. Thank God he wasn’t murdered like IT Director Chris Msando from the successor IEBC in 2017.
I learned that he had and has dismissive and negative opinions of organized civil society generally and people that I worked with to some extent and have liked and admired but I am not very clear why for the most part. Part of it may be that his deference as an insider himself to Kibaki and his establishment executive branch apparatus leads him to have little empathy for a role for outsiders. In particular he evinces no real concern for fraud in the 2007 presidential tally and no moral qualms – as opposed to concerns of international relations – implicated by the question of the participation of candidates in 2013 who were involved in the 2007-08 Post Election Violence.
In particular, the heavily redacted contract materials for IFES from the initial responses to my Freedom of Information Act requests several years ago were much more informative regarding some issues involved in the mechanics of the election and point the way to other sources.
This is the kind of thing that I would be grateful to engage on with the former Chairman.
Of course, ultimately there is a “glass half full or half empty” problem about the 2013 election that will not be fully reconcilable among Kenyans about their own democracy with their own perspectives and interests. On the other hand, for me as an outsider without a “dog in the hunt” directly it seems unequivocal that the glass is partly full of liquid and partly full of air and it is simply a matter of fact to identify what is what even though the significance and value derived from the facts will be a matter of individual judgment for Kenyans.
Sometimes people just have different values and priorities. But maybe 10 years after the fact there is more room for discourse and persuasion than there was in the heat of the struggle.
I was fortunate to get to stop by the Center for Strategic and International Studies last week while in Washington for other business and hear an interesting Africa Program discussion on Senegal. The link here includes the video:
Senegal’s civil society held things together to keep the election process from getting derailed and Senegal has a newly elected opposition leader. While challenges persist everyone who cares about democracy in Africa probably needs a morale boost right now and what learning we can find from the way things played out in Senegal so I encourage you to take a little time to watch.
I very much enjoyed recently reading Democracy Promotion, National Security and Strategy: Foreign Policy in the Reagan Administration by Robert Pee, from 2016 in the Routledge Studies in U.S. Foreign Policy series.
“Robert Pee delivers a carefully crafted, nuanced, and comprehensive study of the rise of democracy promotion as a critical component of US foreign policy under the Reagan administration. The analysis is insightful and sophisticated, offering an excellent understanding of the sources of tensions that animate US democracy promotion’s purpose and practices from its inception to the present days.” Blurb from Dr. Jeff Bridoux from Aberystwyth University, UK.
I highly recommend Pee’s book for anyone involved in or interacting with American democracy assistance. The detailed story of how NED, and NDI, IRI and CIPE as three or the four NED core institutions, “happened” is illuminating and important.
A critical factor that is lost, if not deliberately swept under the rug, in much of the internet commentary that has been generated in contemporary environments, is the fundamental institutional role of Congress in establishing NED.
In the very earliest part of the new Reagan Administration from 1981 the question of democracy assistance was on the table as an aspect of the foreign policy challenges of the late Cold War. Most acutely because of the challenge presented by the Solidarity movement and related happenings in Poland on one hand and the civil war in El Salvador and the revolution in Nicaragua on the other. Within the Administration there were a variety of leading actors and voices reflecting a range of viewpoints. Key questions included consideration of what was beneficial and what was necessary in terms of intellectual and ideological commitments to freedom in the context of the risks of confrontation with the Soviet Union, the stability of the “containment” order and hopes for arms control and other negotiations. Reagan was elected as a critic of President Carter’s new formal policy emphasis on “human rights” as ineffectual in the context of the events such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the hostage-taking by students at the embassy in Iran. So something new and distinguishable was needed. While CIA director William Casey was one of those voices he was far from the only one.
In the meantime, aspirations for democracy assistance had been percolating in academia and civil society since the 1970s. It is essential to place this in the historical context of the post-Vietnam era, and in Pee’s emphasis the era post-Ramparts magazine expose in 1967 of widespread CIA cultural and intellectual subsidies.
In his famous Westminster address to the British Parliament of June 1982 President Reagan made the public commitment to a policy of democracy promotion. With that threshold crossed, the Administration had to come up with actual policy details and bureaucratic structure and the game was on. Reagan’s speech is well worth a re-read, especially to remind of the difficult Cold War context presented by Reagan’s dual commitment to both Strategic Arms Limitation talks with the Soviets and to Solidarity and Poland’s quest “to be Poland”.
Initially those voices of “conservative” caution and constraint who wished the national security structures of the White House to hold the reins won the initial bureaucratic struggle reflected in the Administration’s proposed “Project Democracy” legislation. But however hard it may be to remember this now, in 1983, Congress was a truly co-equal force on these types of foreign policy decisions and the Administration’s proposed “Project Democracy” approach died for lack of support.
In the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate environment, Reagan faced a “permanent” Democratic Party majority in the House of Representatives and a Senate with a range of important and influential thought and action leaders in both parties, with an ideological range in each that would be unthinkable today. Congressional debates on foreign policy were highly engaged and unpredictable. Seniority and Committee structures had greater weight.
And thus the National Endowment for Democracy happened in “strategic fuzziness” as Pee elucidates. At a specific time and place the sausage was made. The Administration had committed to democracy assistance as a new tool of foreign policy and Congress delivered a separate organization “endowed” with funding from Congressional appropriations but not in form a government agency nor reporting to the National Security Council. IRI and NDI which had been incorporated as nonprofits at the Republican and Democratic National Committees respectively earlier that year became “core institutions” of NED and CIPE was formed at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to join the longstanding international “free labor union” arm of the AFL-CIO which became the other two “core institutions”.
NED was made subject by Congress to the Freedom of Information Act and to audit, but not reporting to the White House. Early gambits to restructure NED to bring it under Administration control were defeated. After forty years NED is a both a fixture of “Washington” and a unique creature born of a specific confluence of global events, policy aspirations and domestic democratic politics in the United States in 1983.
[In reference to my previous posts, this background can explain, in addition to more important things, why Carl Gershman as fledgling NED’s president would have been attracted to having use of Henry Kissinger’s perceived “stature” and “gravitas” inside-the-Beltway” in Washington as a NED board member even if Kissinger was not interested enough in the mission relative to his other priorities to be able to attend the meetings.]
