US Military may be uniquely situated to help in ebola crisis [updated]

[Sept. 19:  For a contra view see this column from @MeanCharlotte in the Los Angeles Times, reflective of views on the right that the military, at least under this president, is not the right tool for "wars" that are metaphorical rather than involving combat ("Ebola isn't the Islamic State.  It's a virus."). Likewise, some of those on the left, particularly in Africa, who are suspicious of AFRICOM in concept, are leery of hidden motives. Many envision a deployment heavy on combat-ready "warfighters" to conduct a mission skewed toward policing or physical security in a way that I don't expect to be what is planned or what will transpire.  Not disputing the basis for wariness based on experience with recent wars and some relief and development efforts, I "stick to my guns" (metaphorically) in seeing this crisis and the balance of options available differently.]

Regarding the AFRICOM deployment to lead/assist the U.S. response to the ebola crisis in West Africa, here is a link to a fact sheet describing the basic work of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Ft. Detrick, Maryland.  The Institute was established in 1969 and has as a primary function ongoing work on botulism, plague, anthrax and ebola, among other threats to military personnel and to public health.  They do pioneering work on vaccines in these areas, for instance.

The U.S. military is not necessarily well suited for all the various tasks that it gets assigned because no one else in the U.S. government is staffed or funded or otherwise able to do them.  Addressing an infectious epidemic on a crisis basis is much more suited to military leadership, and our specifically planned for and developed capacities, than general “development” or disaster relief work, I believe.

The U.S. military has a huge medical capacity in its own right to serve the military itself, in peacetime and as deployed around the world, along with civilian dependents and others, separately from combat-specific capacity.  We have a volunteer military, but once you volunteer you are subject to being assigned on a “command and control” basis that makes the military more flexible in a crisis than a civilian governmental or private entity.  I am one of those people who have concerns that we should have more capacity in other parts of our government, including civilian development and diplomacy functions, but such concerns should not makes us unduly reticent to use the resources that are available to help address an immediate human crisis as best we can.

Likewise, I am not an advocate of promiscuous use of the military either for war or as a substitute development agency–see my post from  2010:  “Provocative Question: To Eliminate Redundancy, Should We Move USAID From DOS to DOD?” –so I understand the general concern or skepticism, but in this specific instance we in the United States, and people at risk in West Africa, need to make use of the resources developed and available through the military.

[Update: See this from Foreign Policy: "Can the U.S. Army Degrade and Destroy Ebola?" from an expert who had an opportunity to have input on the planning.]

Catching up on some prior must reads:

“John Githongo: corruption in Kenya is poisoning politics” from The Guardian, July 3.

“After Westgate: opportunities and challenges in the war against Al-Shabaab”, a Chatam House paper by Paul D. Williams, July.

.  .  .  As Al-Shabaab loses territory and its popularity among Somalis continues to dwindle, other clan- and region-based actors will become more salient as national debates over federalism, the decentralization of governance mechanisms beyond Mogadishu and the place of clannism will occupy centre stage. As a consequence, AMISOM’s principal roles should gradually shift from degrading Al-Shabaab towards a broader stabilization agenda: encouraging a national consensus over how to build effective governance structures; developing an effective set of Somali National Security Forces; and ensuring that the Federal Government delivers services and effective governance to its citizens, especially beyond Mogadishu in the settlements recently captured from Al-Shabaab. As it stands, however, AMISOM is not prepared to carry out these activities. More worryingly, nor is the Somali Federal Government.

Why did Obama not arrest a ‘bad-marred’ schoolgirl, and how can the Scot gets a divorce referendum without a war?

Originally posted on naked chiefs:

AS Africans, we have every right to hold a grudge (even hate) the west: They colonised us and, worse, subjected Africans to the worst form of degradation and exploitation – slavery (though, of course, our chiefs were deeply complicit in this crime).

Yet, hate it as we might, the West keeps throwing stuff at us that we can’t ignore, and that forces us to think deeply about our own political societies work – or don’t.

Let us start with the small one. A few days ago US President Barack Obama visited a Washington DC school, where he and First Michelle took part in an event, filling schoolbags with toys for homeless children.

This is how the BBC reported what happened in a story entitled President Barack Obama puts brave face on schoolgirl’s Beyoncé snub”:

A Washington DC schoolgirl has prompted laughter from the US President after admitting that…

View original 476 more words

A few thoughts about ethnic polarization in Kenya as we wait on the ICC

image

I want to touch here briefly on what I have seen and heard in regard to ethnic “issues”–prejudice, discrimination, suspicion, solidarity, hate speech, and such–in Kenya.

An important thing for outsiders to realize is how complex, and deliberately obscured, these things are in Kenyan politics–and how much of what is said in popular fora in the United States is at least misleading if not flatly wrong factually and in some cases deliberately malicious. (I have finally just now brought myself to read the whole Chapter 4 on “Kenya, Odinga, Communism and Islam” in Jerome Corsi’s book The Obama Nation which was published shortly after I returned from Kenya in the summer of 2008 during the American presidential campaign.  It was a major bestseller and thousands of Americans may have read more about Kenyan politics in that chapter than they have ever read elsewhere over their lifetimes.  Corsi has a Ph.D in Political Science from Harvard, so he is certainly credentialed far beyond me, and he is way too smart to get into the “birther” nonsense that captivated so many American politicians for a few years, but he paints a picture of the Kenyan election and the post election violence that is very much at odds with my understanding and experience, as well as anything I heard expressed internally at the International Republican Institute, or through my family’s church in Kenya or from our missionary friends or at my children’s missionary supported school.  In other words, malicious.)

One of the most important and interesting things that I have learned (so far) from my Freedom of Information Act requests to the State Department relating to observation of the 2007 Kenyan election was that the Ambassador’s staff reported to him and up the chain during the campaign that while there was hate speech showing up on both sides of the ODM/Odinga and PNU/Kibaki contest, the greater weight of it was directed against Odinga.  This surprised me because I had relatively limited separate interaction with anyone else at the State Department besides the Ambassador and his personal approach and attitude in my dealings with him certainly gave no hint of this background from his staff in the context of his tactics in addressing the Kenyan campaign.

The bottom line here is there is plenty of this “negative ethnicity” to go around and most of it you will never see in the newspaper or otherwise in the media–even in Kenya, much less of course internationally.  My personal experiences before the election in 2007 involved going to lunch with young middle class professional Kenyans–essentially strangers to me–who would openly and unashamedly if privately express the type of stereotypes about members of other tribes that you or I might hear in a private club in New Orleans about “the blacks” (if you are “white like me” anyway).

The attacks on Kikuyu in parts of the Rift Valley that underlie the ICC charges against Ruto and Sang were sick and sickening (as were those in 1992 and 1997) and so were the attacks in Naivasha and elsewhere that underlie the ICC charges against Kenyatta.  So was the post election violence in Nairobi and Kisumu and other places that were not covered in the ICC charges. The families in Nairobi that I knew that suffered personally from the violence in those early weeks of 2008 were from various “tribes”.  The families that sheltered in our compound happened to be Luhya and Luo; my staff were diverse but Kikuyu were more represented than others.  All of us who were there are all colored emotionally I am sure by our personal experiences in that searing time.

Whether Ocampo as ICC prosecutor used good judgment choosing to bring charges against only six individuals as “most responsible” I do not have enough information to evaluate.  To be frank, there are aspects of Ocampo’s approach as a lawyer and public figure during those last years of his tenure at the ICC that I am not personally enthused about.  To be fair, as a real man and a real lawyer, he was never going to be as “big” as so many Kenyans looked for him to be when they were painting his picture on matatus and such, and he realistically never had any chance for more than some very small success against the dragon of impunity in Kenya.  Just as the Government of Kenya was never really going to prosecute the post election killers, the Government of Kenya was never really going to cooperate with the prosecution by the ICC.  Now we will have to see if the Trial Chamber is willing to pursue enforcement of the Government’s obligations or not.

Personally, I am not inclined to believe that the facts of the charges against the remaining three ICC defendants are based on either mistaken identity, or on some massive international conspiracy to frame them.  I could be wrong of course.  As far as Uhuru, I tend to credit the observation of a Kikuyu friend who said “I don’t support Raila, but its an open secret” that Uhuru did the gist of what he is accused of doing.  I heard things about these matters in Nairobi in “real time” in early 2008 from the same types of general discussion that covered a lot of other important information that you won’t ever see in a Kenyan newspaper.  But all hearsay.  Maybe if the cases are dismissed, someday we will find out who really did it.

The most important question though is whether Kenyans want to treat each other differently badly enough to change the underlying kind of prejudice that makes a dangerous minority of Kenyans vulnerable to the hate speech from the politicians who will continue to use it until it stops working for them. Better democracy and effective governance for broader development in Kenya will depend on this change.

How will the U.S. handle its involvement with a possible Kenyan referendum?

We have the examples of Kenya’s constitutional referenda of 2005 and 2010 for some lessons.

In the fall of 2005, the Government of Kenya, on behalf of the “Wako Draft” constitution being brought to a referendum vote–the “Banana campaign”– loudly claimed that the U.S. was interfering in the referendum in opposition to President Kibaki’s position.  In 2010, Americans campaigning against the “Committee of Experts as Amended” Draft complained that the U.S. was interfering in the referendum by supporting the “Yes” campaign.

I am not aware that there was any substance to the allegations in 2005.  For one thing, it was not clear to me by the time I was on the scene in Kenya in mid-2007 that people at the State Department were necessarily glad that the referendum had failed.  One American official suggested to me that the Wako Draft had not been that bad and certainly better than the old constitution that everyone was left to deal with.  My inclination is that the campaign rhetoric from some of Kibaki’s ministers was just that–campaign rhetoric using the American “bogeyman” as a foil to rally solidarity from Kibaki’s political base (in other words, a somewhat milder version of what the Uhruruto campaign did with more success in 2013, less the ICC “bogeyman”).  Admittedly, I was not involved in 2005 and have made no independent investigation of the matter so I am not purporting to offer any definitive opinion. The International Republican Institute exit poll funded by USAID was consistent with the big victory for the “Orange” side officially reported by the Electoral Commission of Kenya following the vote in November 2005.

In 2010, things were different.  Congressman Christopher Smith of New Jersey, Chairman of the relevant subcommittee covering Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs pressed the issue and it was eventually reported in the Daily Nation that Smith had received a report from the USAID Inspector General that “found that US funding did go specifically to encourage “Yes” vote on referendum.”  In that situation, however, the Government of Kenya was not complaining because Kibaki himself, along with former “Orange” leader Raila Odinga as Prime Minister, was supporting the Amended Draft.  The Amended Draft was jiggered to accommodate the negotiated interests of most political leaders in the “government of national unity” around both Kibaki and ODM.  There was some organized opposition led by William Ruto which outpolled the Draft in the Rift Valley, but only there.  At the time, Ruto was on the outs with both the President’s faction and with ODM, among other things from pressure tied to allegations about participation in post election violence and certain pending corruption allegations, so no one outside his immediate base was too concerned about his position.

Process purists like myself thought it was wrong for the U.S. to let our funding cross into the campaign itself, beyond simply assisting the process–and to deny it if we did do it.  Americans who opposed the Kenyan Draft because of their concerns about the impact of language on the two “contentious issues”–the Khadi’s Courts and abortion–did not like to have their tax dollars used against them in the campaign.  Kenyans who opposed the Draft may have had comparable feelings in regard to U.S. “democracy assistance” spending, but I didn’t pick up on much complaint–given that their own government was campaigning against them, the U.S. funding as a distinct issue would not be the first and most obvious issue about neutrality, even though the sums of money involved were quite huge for Kenya.

The other key aspect to the context of 2010 is that there was great pent up public demand for a reformed constitution that had been promised for years. The ” yes” side won in a landslide and surveys afterward showed that Kenyans were approaching unanimity in being glad that the constitution had passed. In this environment, the process details about funding do not seem to have so much actual or perceived political significance.

As far as a 2015 referendum triggered by the current petition drive, I have no idea what approach people in our various foreign policy organizations would take on substance.  In general, I doubt people in the U.S. government would care very much directly one way or the other regarding constitutional amendments now unless something unexpected showed up in a draft late in the game.

I haven’t heard or read anything about “the reform agenda” from Washington in a long time even though it was for some years a constant refrain from the State Department.  “Reform” seems to have happened in 2010 and have borne fruit with the IEBC’s decision on the 2013 election being accepted by the opposition,  challenged only in court.  The lion’s share of “reform agenda” that was envisioned in the 2008 post election settlement has not come to pass–for instance the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission seems to have become just one more Kenyan Commission  producing a report to be somewhat censored then shelved for the edification of future scholars who might want to know more about what has gone wrong over the years.  Likewise, there is nearly universal impunity now settled for all the acts of post election violence, subject only to the three last cases lingering at the ICC–so one way or the other, most people involved will have gone scot free. The biggest substantive recommendation of the Kreigler Commission, which found the whole election in 2007 to have been a bust, was to deploy electronic reporting of the vote tallies from the polling station to Nairobi as opposed to depending on physical carriage of the paper forms.  That single most crucial upgrade was a complete failure in the 2013 election–in circumstances that were left murky–and the IEBC turned out not even to even have a working process to handle the reporting on paper.  Nonetheless, if “we” the United States were going to get too exercised about any of this, surely we would have done so in 2013 when we were faced with the embarrassment of having a relationship with an elected government led by ICC suspects.  Instead we bent over backwards to find ways to praise another poor election process because it wasn’t openly stolen at the the presidential level this time and murder and mayhem didn’t follow.  Now everyone seems to have pretty much gotten used to that formerly unprecedented situation of close diplomatic interaction with ICC suspects.  Bottom line is that I doubt that my government will want to play heavily pro or con in a Kenya referendum in the near future.

Nonetheless, I think we can count on the U.S. being very much involved even assuming we are not much concerned about the outcome.  A State Department report has estimated that international support for the 2013 election was approximately $60M, with more than $37M in “medium term” USAID funding.  We have had IFES embedded with the ECK/IEBC for every vote starting with 2001 for the 2002 election; we have funded polling and election observation each time, along with a gamut of other activities.  One way or the other, I am sure we will be “all up in it”.  On balance, the Government of Kenya has liked it that way–for whatever reason–because that has been the choice that they have made, year in and year out, in accepting our money.  Even if they point and holler during the campaign.

“We see Africa’s potential”

"We see Africa's potential"

“We see Africa’s potential”

This week’s Africa Summit in Washington suggests hope for a deeper, broader engagement between the United States and many African countries. This is a policy area where there seems to be substantial room for negotiated agreement and cooperation between Republicans and Democrats. While there are things that I wish we would do differently, I am glad to see the effort and attention and I will watch with interest.

Ahead of Washington Summit, Setback for Kenya’s Attorney General in pre-trial defense of President Kenyatta at ICC

 

Counting-the original tally

Counting-the original tally; December 27, 2007

“ICC acts tough on Uhuru’s assets, phone records” Daily Nation, July 30.

The International Criminal Court has directed that the Kenyan government be compelled to provide the property and financial records associated with President Uhuru Kenyatta if the government was not ready to fully cooperate.

In a ruling on Tuesday, the judges further unanimously endorsed the prosecution’s revised request that Attorney-General Githu Muigai had contested during the status conference on July 9.

The AG seems to have lost his argument, as the Trial Chamber V (B) ruled that the prosecution’s request was right within the provisions of the Rome Statute of cooperation.

.  .  .  .

The judges further directed the prosecution to “pursue all possible means to get Mr Kenyatta’s telephone records.

. . . .

Of the items that Ms Bensouda had requested she was only able to obtain the details of four the vehicles Mr Kenyatta owned or regularly used between November 1, 2007 and April 1, 2008. These were obtained with the consent of the accused.

In fact, Lands secretary Charity Ngilu, in a letter that was read to the court, said that “doing the best with the resources and time available to us, we have not located any land, title or property registered under the name of Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta.”

. . . .

. . . .

The Chamber also trashed arguments by the AG that the “work of prosecution investigators was being outsourced to the Kenyan government”. The judges, Kuniko Ozaki, Geoffrey Henderson and Robert Fremr, also validated the extensive requests by ICC prosecutors.

“It is a reasonable investigative premise that an accused with access to substantial resources may choose to act through various intermediary entities, as this would in particular, reduce the traceability of transactions intended to further a criminal purpose,” they said.

Githu had dismissed the request by Prosecution Chief Fatou Bensouda as irrelevant to the charges and too broad. The wide-ranging requests, which were made public for the first time late Tuesday seeks disclosure of the President’s records for about three years beginning June 1, 2007 to December 15, 2010.

“Investigations inquiries may not be confined merely to the immediate period of the violence,” the judges ruled. “In the context of certain records, a longer time period may also be justified for comparison purposes where pattern of activity may be significant in revealing unusual communication or transactions.”

This is the second time the ICC Judges are asking the Kenyan authorities to use compulsion to comply with its cooperation obligations to the court. The judges have threatened to refer Kenya to the Assembly of State Parties if it declines to disclose the records.

Already, a separate chamber has issued orders to the govern- ment to compel nine witnesses to testify against Deputy President William Ruto and his co-accused, journalist Joshua Sang. Uhuru’s trial is set to begin on October 7.

. . . .

If you are in Washington for the Africa Summit or otherwise on August 7 you can have dinner with H.E. Kenyatta at the Grand Hyatt from 7-9pm, sponsored by the Corporate Council on Africa, for $200 if you are not a member of the Council, or $100 if your are.  Members (only) may wish to join H.E. Teodoro Obiang of Equitorial Guinea, starting at 6pm that night at the St. Regis.  Perhaps with a good driver you can catch both.  To register follow the links here; the Council is also hosting several less controversial events surrounding the Summit.

 

Uganda: “bursting at the seams” says State OIG inspection

The State Department Office of the Inspector General released this afternoon its latest regular inspection report for the U.S. Embassy in Uganda. The Kampala mission, the second largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, gets good marks, but is facing critical physical space problems from ongoing and expected growth–“bursting at the seams”. More of general interest, how does the IG summarize the context of the mission of the United States in Uganda? Here you are:

Uganda has experienced nearly three decades of domestic stability, except in northern areas. President Museveni’s National Resistance Movement took power in 1986. Irregularities marred his reelection in 2011, and he is expected to run again in 2016. Uganda has never experienced a peaceful transition of political power, and civil society does not effectively hold government accountable. Uganda’s record on democracy, human rights, and anticorruption is poor, but it has become an important force for regional stability in East Africa. It contributes to the African Union Mission in Somalia, leads regional efforts against the Lord’s Resistance Army, and has mediated talks between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the M23 rebels.
The passage of Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Act in early 2014 prompted Washington to reassess the bilateral relationship, including U.S. foreign assistance, which was taking place during the inspection. Bilateral security cooperation has included peacekeeping training for Ugandan forces in Somalia and Ugandan support for the 2013 evacuation of U.S. diplomats from South Sudan.
Economic growth over the past decade has averaged 6 to 7 percent, with inflation in the single digits, and the percentage of the population in poverty dropped by half. Uganda’s population is projected to grow from 35 million to more than 60 million over the next 20 years, threatening to erode and even reverse development progress. The economy provides one job for every 40 new entrants to the job market. By the end of this decade, Uganda may be an oil- producing country, which would significantly raise government revenue but could also exacerbate corruption. U.S. exports to Uganda in 2012 totaled $100 million, half of which consisted of aircraft and machinery.
HIV/AIDS prevalence rates declined in the early 1990s to less than 7 percent, one of the lowest rates in Africa, but has begun to rise again. The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) FY 2013 assistance budget for Uganda was $67.5 million for development, $11 million for Food for Peace, and $84.95 million for the Global Health Initiative. The Department of State (Department) also provided $316.14 million for the Global Health Initiative, $190,000 in foreign military financing, and $522,000 in international military engagement and training. International narcotics control and law enforcement funding of $600,000 went directly to Uganda.
With 712 employees, the embassy is the second largest in Sub-Saharan Africa and includes 147 U.S. direct hires compared to 91 in 2007. Other departments and agencies represented in the embassy include USAID, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Federal Aviation Administration, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and the Peace Corps. The embassy chancery accommodates all employees and has annexes in Gulu (CDC) and Entebbe (CDC and DOD), which are 7 hours away and 90 minutes away, respectively, by vehicle. In addition, the general services office and warehouse facility is located 6 kilometers from the embassy compound, and it has more desks than some smaller embassies in Africa.

Uhuru Kenyatta, Jendayi Frazer and Paul Kagame walk into a commodity exchange in Kigali . . .

Swiss trader looks up and says, “You must be here to save Kenya’s small family farmers!”

Post-election IDP camp at Naivasha, Kenya, 2008

Post-election IDP camp at Naivasha, Kenya, 2008

“Could Rwanda’s Kagame get thrown out of the ‘smoke filled room’?” AfriCommons, 13 March 2014

“East Africa Exchange Formally Launched” BizTech Africa, 4 July 2014

“Carter Center release; Initial observations on the ‘Frazer v. Carson’ controversy”  AfriCommons, 21 Feb. 2013

“Beth Mugo Admits Kenyatta Family Owns Huge Tracts of Land, But Defends Uhuru” Mwakilishi, 12 Feb. 2013

“How Kosgei pulled strings to block U.S. from endorsing Kibaki presidency” Daily Nation, 13 July 2012

“Kenyan PM Odinga Speaks Out on Election, ‘Dubious’ Role of Jendayi Frazer and Ambassador” AfriCommons, 4 March 2010

Part Ten–FOIA Documents from Kenya’s 2007 election–Ranneberger at ECK: “[Much caan happen between the casting of votes and the final tabulation of ballots and it did” AfriCommons, 30 April 2012

“Africa Bureau under Frazer coordinated “recharacterization” of 2007 exit poll showing Odinga win (New Documents–FOIA Series No. 12)” AfriCommons, 18 March 2013

Kenya Defense Forces essentially collaborating with Al Shabaab in illegal charcoal exports

The Institute for Defense AnalysesAfrica Watch publication (PDF below) has a discussion by Amb. George Ward of the recent report for the UNEP and Interpol on the banned charcoal trade from Somalia (“The Somali Charcoal Industry–Strange Bedfellows”). Rather than shut down the trade that has been the primary revenue source for Al Shabaab, the Kenyan Defense Forces have continued the trade out of Kismayo, which they captured nearly two years ago, along with their present day allies in the Ras Kamboni militia. Further, the KDF is apparently participating in the same overall network of deforestation, charcoal production and brokered export trade that includes continued unmolested shipping by Al Shabaab itself from Baraawe. The traders include businessmen established in Nairobi and Garissa, so Kenya profits on that end too.

Fortunately for the Kenyan taxpayers, the EU and the United States primarily fund the AMISOM mission which has covered the Kenyan forces since mid-2012. Something tells me the charcoal proceeds generated through the KDF are not going to the Kenyan treasury.

africawatch-july-10-2014-vol5.pdf

Of course, other reports of KDF dealing in the charcoal trade have been out there for a long time.  See my post “Kenya’s persistent national security corruption continues to burden Somali endeavors”.

Saba Saba; Sawa, Sawa: the sky did not fall

IMG_7705

As I noted, rallies will come and rallies will go.  The challenge of governmental dysfunction, propped up by tribalism, remains.  This photograph is from the day before the 2013 election at the public primary school in Nairobi’s posh Westlands neighborhood.  I suspect the scene was much the same yesterday and is much the same today.