How will the Iran nuclear deal play out in East Africa?

I wish I had a clear sense of how this might develop but I don’t.  It seems to me that there may be several areas of impact over the next few years:

+Diplomatic leverage of Museveni, Kenyatta, Kigame et al vis-a-vis the United States will be reduced as one of the main US “asks”–UN votes to maintain nuclear-related sanctions against Iran–drops away.

+While I do not foresee the current US administration raising expectations for other US priorities from these East African leaders, the next US administration might feel some greater freedom to address “the democratic recession,” declining press freedom, and other issues on the formal US policy list.

+Oil prices:  if a lot more Iranian oil gets to market both in the near term from the immediate impact of lifting sanctions and the longer term from the increase in capacity associated with ramped up foreign investment, the prospects for oil production in Uganda and Kenya will be impacted, especially as related to the 2021-22 election cycle.

+Iran will reassume a stronger role in trade and finance in the region and thus compete more strongly with Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.

+Iran will presumably increase its regional naval presence.

+The fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya and subsequent sad state of affairs in that country reduced one major “petrocash” player in East African politics; an Iran less cash-strapped by UN sanctions might have aspirations to finance East African politicians aside from its espionage/security/terrorism enagement.

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2 thoughts on “How will the Iran nuclear deal play out in East Africa?

  1. Perhaps Iranian sanctions busting activities in East Africa will be abandoned and Quds Force agents will leave Mombasa, Dar and Zanzibar; Mossad operations may be scaled back with support for Kenya ATPU declining. Kenya really doesn’t benefit from any of this confusion: elephants fighting and grass getting trampled sort of stuff!

    • Agree–I would certainly rather see Kenyan trading with people and companies other than the gov’t of the IRI (Iran). The Iranian government was involved in terrorism in places like Argentina, for instance, well before the current sanctions issues relating to the nuclear program so I am not sure there is any reason to think they will be less supportive of terrorism now that they will have more financial flexibility going forward.

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