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Tag Archives: African Studies Association

“Friday Night Lights” for African Politics scholars

Posted on December 4, 2016 by Ken
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At the African Studies Association annual meeting in Washington;

the African Politics Conference Group


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Posted in African Studies, democracy, elections, Humor/Humour, Kenya, Photographs, United States | Tagged #ASA2016, Adrienne LeBas, African Politics Conference Group, African Studies, African Studies Association, Carl leVan, Development4Security, pol, politicsl scientists, Texas in Africa | Leave a reply

The challenge for the West in Kenya’s 2012 election–and how we can learn and do better this time

Posted on November 22, 2011 by Ken
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I just returned from a few days at the annual conference of the African Studies Association, held in Washington this year.  This gave me the chance to hear presentations by and informally rub elbows with some of the most knowledgeable experts on Kenya and African democracy and governance from a variety of places and institutions around the world.  The summary overview is that as we approach four years from the last election, there is so much that is still “up in the air” about the next one that it is impossible to know much about how it will play out.

Here is my view of where things are:

1.  The election date remains in active dispute.  Much Kenyan opinion holds that the new Constitution mandates an election in August of 2012 which is fast approaching.  The members of the brand new electoral commission have said in the recent past that they cannot be ready by then.  The Cabinet has just withdrawn a bill in Parliament to amend the Constitution to move the date [update: the Speaker has ruled that the bill may be re-filed tomorrow and be heard] and the Supreme Court has ruled that the matter must come up through normal channels through the High Court rather than be determined by an advisory opinion.

2.  While it is positive that the new Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission has been formed in a process widely seen as appropriate, the time involved means that we do not yet even know the constituencies and boundaries for the new elections; further this new Commission is untested.

3.  The issue of implementing the gender balance in Parliament under the new Constitution remains unsettled.  A lot of seats and salaries are at stake on this issue.

4.  Candidates, parties and coalitions remain very much unsettled and can be expected to remain so.   There has been very little obvious progress in actually enforcing the laws governing political parties and elected officials in relation to parties.  The relationship between “parties” and “coalitions” remains elusive.

5.  Politics in Kenya certainly seems more openly ethnic now than at a similar time in the 2007 election cycle.  One could perhaps make the argument that it is better to have it more “on the table” rather than “under the table”, but I do not necessarily buy that.  Regardless, there is this time no basis for outsiders to underestimate it.  How this will play out in the campaigns is unknown.

6.  Like in 2007, we have high inflation rates for staples such that the wananchi are being squeezed on the basic cost of living–while the GDP growth rate in the region and in Kenya is much less robust than in 2006-07–all aside from the drought and food crisis in many regions.  Whether this will get better or worse as the election approaches is unknown.

7.  Corruption remains a huge issue.  Overall there may have been some small progress at the margins, but in reality the accumulation of exposed cases of major graft in which no one major has been prosecuted just continues to grow.  The corruption in the 2007 election specifically was swept under the rug.  No one has been held accountable and the facts have remained concealed enough that any politician or spokesman can say whatever they want about what happened last time.  It seems to me hard to argue that there is much deterrent in place to attempts to corrupt the 2012 elections.

8.  The threat from terrorism seems to be greater and this time Kenya itself rather than Ethiopia is at war in Somalia.

No one that I heard or talked to seemed to feel that we knew much more about how the next Kenyan election might play out now than we did when I attended the same conference in New Orleans in 2009.

And yet, I picked up on what I see as disturbing reports of a repetition of the complacency that we got burned by in 2007.  At the risk of sounding “preachy” I want to argue passionately that this is a mistake.

Okay, Kenya had a peaceful and well accepted referendum in 2010 when there were worries about violence.  Let me explain why I don’t think at means so much in regard to 2012.

First, the referendum was not a close election–just as the 2002 NARC election was not a close election.  The question in the referendum was how big the margin would be, not whether it would pass.  Since the outcome of the referendum was not in play it would not have been impacted by violence or protests one way or the other.  In 2007 the outcome was in play and disputed and violence served the interests of both sides to a point.

If there had been no protests regarding the election Odinga would never have become Prime Minister–and the incumbent government was clearly committed to not allowing protests, and clearly prioritized keeping power over security for the public.  At the same time, if there had not been a murderous mobilization of Kalenjin militias against Kikuyu in the Rift Valley to the point of what Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer controversially labeled “ethnic cleansing” there might have been some remedial action about the subversion of the election count itself.   This was the approach initially advocated by the EU and other Western countries.  I would like to think that if this militia violence in the Rift Valley had been less egregious that perhaps the higher levels of the U.S. government might have come around to some form of election remediation in spite of the U.S. Ambassador’s approach.  Obviously I have no way to know–but the point remains, I think, that even the violence against Kikuyu in the Rift Valley in a way indirectly helped keep for Kibaki the new five year term that the ECK awarded him.

The bottom line is that violence ended up “working” in a sense for certain political interests in 2007-08–and the price was paid only by the wananchi so far–whereas there was no political utility for such violence in 2010.

Further, the referendum was a national vote and the outcome at individual polling centres and in localities and regions did not directly matter–very unlike the simultaneous election of the President and MPs and local officials in Kenyan General Elections.

On balance, the 2010 Referendum seems to me to provide less reasonable assurance about a clean and safe General Election in 2012 than the2002 General Election and the 2005 Referendum would have provided in 2007.

There are Kenyans whose opinions I respect who think that the era of election violence is over in Kenya because of the actions of the ICC to date.  Perhaps.  I hope they are right, but I do not see that it makes sense to bet anyone’s life on it. Which presidential contender today is showing up in the polls as less popular because he was charged by the ICC prosecutor and named in various investigative reports about the post election violence?  Who knows what will happen with the ICC process or what impact it will ultimately have?

The key for Western donors is to be prepared for contingencies rather than guessing and gambling about what might or might not happen.  To have the political will to “call out” the electoral commission before the election if it abandons the practices and tools that are clearly necessary to have a transparent and reliable election.  To reserve judgment on the process until it is concluded.  To speak out, at least, if Kenya’s paramilitary  security forces are diverted for political purposes such as sealing off Kibera and defending Uhuru Park to keep it free of protestors.  To commit to transparency to assure trust.  And to decide now how to respond to violence if things go wrong later.

To close this, I am going to fulfill a personal request from someone from the West who was importantly involved in trying to help the process last time by linking to an account of a Kenyan investigative journalist to the Kriegler Commission about what was happening in Kibera in the last election.  I have to do this with a READER DISCRETION ADVISED WARNING–this is not “family-friendly” reading.  I have no personal knowledge of any of the specifics but this does come with the personal recommendation of someone very credible who knows the source well.  We all know that Kenyan politics can be murderous and there is no reason to be complacent.

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Posted in corruption, democracy, elections, International Criminal Court, Journalism, Kenya, Nairobi, US | Tagged 2012 election, African Studies Association, election violence, Jendayi Frazer, Kenya, Kibera, parliament, Rift Valley, Somalia | 3 Replies

What Kenya did for democracy in Ghana . . . and a “must see” movie

Posted on November 15, 2011 by Ken
2

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies has published last week its “Special Report No. 1,” an extensive analysis of “Africa and the Arab Spring:  A New Era of Democratic Expectations” by a blue ribbon group of experts.  As the title suggests, the basic conclusion is that the environment in Sub-Saharan Africa has been and will continue to be influenced by the dynamic of anti-authoritarian change from the Arab Spring, whereas in general the non-Arab states in Africa have advanced much further in democratization since the end of the Cold War, such that the pressure for the popular ouster of current governments is not comparable.

One example of progress from “lessons learned” is seen in the performance of the election authorities in Ghana in 2008 following the disaster in Kenya in 2007:

A key turning point in the recognition of the critical need for stronger EMBs [Electoral Management Bodies] in Africa came in 2007/2008. The run-up to a hotly contested presidential election on December 28, 2007 in Kenya had generated strong emotions that had become polarized along ethnic lines. Yet, bolstered by increasingly credible voting in 1997 and 2002, many assumed Kenya’s 2007 elections would be managed effectively. Accordingly, relatively fewer international observers participated. In fact, the voting itself went smoothly — with 70 percent turnout. However, blatant ballot-stuffing during the vote-tallying ensued. Unexplained delays in the reporting of results generated a swirl of rumors and further escalated tensions. At nightfall three days later, the Electoral Commission of Kenya, members of which had been appointed by incumbent President Mwai Kibaki, announced that the president had won the election by a difference of 2 percentage points, and promptly certified the results. Kibaki was sworn in at a closed ceremony within hours. Destruction of most of the physical ballots before the official result was announced prevented any authoritative followup inquiry.

The announcement immediately set off clashes throughout Kenya leading to more than 1,500 deaths and the estimated displacement of 350,000 people. Occurring in one of Africa’s most cosmopolitan  the Kenyan tragedy had broad reverberations around the continent. Indeed, many observers argued that, despite the charged atmosphere and other shortcomings of the process, if Kenya’s electoral commission had simply done its job and not certified elections until allegations of fraud were investigated, the violent aftermath could have been averted.

The distillation of this lesson was put into sharp relief with Ghana’s electoral experience exactly one year later. In a tightly contended second-round presidential election, the opposition candidate, John Atta Mills, of the National Democratic Congress, eked out a victory — 50.2 to 49.8 percent — over the incumbent party candidate, Nana Akufo-Addo. Yet stability prevailed. Akufo-Addo publicly congratulated his rival and called on all Ghanaians to rally behind their new president.

Key to the successful outcome was the equanimity of Electoral Commission of Ghana (ECG).  Despite enormous pressure to announce a result immediately following the close of the polls, the electoral commission waited five days for the votes from all jurisdictions to be counted and charges of irregularities investigated before certifying the results. The integrity of the process and the chairman of the ECG, Dr. Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, reassured the Ghanaian public that the outcome was fair.  Empowered with this legitimacy, Atta Mills has subsequently overseen Ghana’s continued rapid rate of economic growth.

The drama of the 2008 Ghanaian election is well captured in the documentary movie “An African Election” by Jarreth Merz which is reviewed in the Los Angeles Times this week.  The film will be screened Saturday evening in Washington at the African Studies Association.  I highly recommend it.  My daughter and I were able to see it at the New Orleans Film Festival a few weeks ago and we were both impressed and moved in the context of our experience in Kenya in 2007.

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Posted in African Union, Kenya | Tagged "An African Election", "Jarreth Merz", Africa, Africa Center for Security Studies, African Studies Association, elections, electoral commission, Ghana, Kenya | 2 Replies

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FOIA Cables and the 2007 Kenyan election--a series

  • a. Lessons for Kenya's 2012 election from the truth trickling out about 2007–New cables from FOIA (Part One)
  • b. Lessons from the 2007 elections and the new FOIA cables–Part Two
  • c. Lessons from the 2007 Kenyan election and the new FOIA cables–Part Three
  • d. Lessons from the 2007 elections and the new FOIA cables–Part Four
  • e. Lessons from the 2007 elections and the new FOIA cables–Part Five
  • f. Part Six–What did the U.S. Ambassador report to Washington the day after the Kenyan election?
  • g. Part Seven–One last FOIA cable on the 2007 Exit Poll
  • h. Part Eight–New Kenya FOIA documents: Diplomacy vs. Assistance Revisted; or Why Observe Elections If We Don't Tell People What We See?
  • i. Part Nine–What Narrative Was the State Department's Africa Bureau Offering the Media While Kenyans Were Still Voting? And Why?
  • j. Part Ten–FOIA documents from Kenya's 2007 election–Ranneberger at the ECK: "Much can happen between the casting of of votes and final tabulation of ballots, and it did"
  • k. Freedom of Information Series (Part 11): Better to Learn More Lessons from Kenya's Last Election After the Next One?
  • l. Africa Bureau under Frazer coordinated "recharacterization" of 2007 Kenya Exit Poll showing Odinga win (New Documents–FOIA Series No. 12)
  • m. Why is IRI’s report on the Kenya 2007 Exit Poll missing from the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse? (FOIA Series Part 13)
  • n. The simple truth of the allegedly "contested" Kenya 2007 exit poll–what IRI reported to USAID (FOIA series part 14, War for History series part 19)

Organizations

  • ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (UNDEF)-Kenya
  • Africa Research Institute
  • African Politics Conference Group
  • AFRICOG: Africa Centre for Open Governance
  • Centre for Multiparty Democracy-Kenya
  • East Africa Initiative–Open Society
  • ELOG–Election Observation Group
  • InformAction–Kenya 2017 election reporting
  • International Center for Transitional Justice–Kenya
  • International Commission of Jurists–Kenyan Section
  • Inuka Kenya Trust
  • Kenya Human Rights Commission
  • National Council of Churches of Kenya
  • Transparency Int'l-Kenya

Studies and Reports

  • "Ballots to Bullets"–Human Rights Watch
  • "Count Down to Deception: 30 Hours that Destroyed Kenya" – Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice
  • "Kenya: a country fragmented" – Africa Research Institute
  • "Turning Pebbles: Evading Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya"–Human Rights Watch, Dec. '11
  • Commission of Inquiry into 2007 elections (Kriegler Commssion)
  • Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (Waki Report)
  • USAID–Assessment of the Pre-electoral Environment: AN EVALUATION OF SUPPORT TO THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR . . . 2007 ELECTIONS

US Government

  • Africa Center for Security Studies
  • AFRICOM–US Military Command
  • House Foreign Affairs Committee
  • Senate Foreign Relations Committee
  • State Dept. Africa Bureau
  • U.S. Senate Resolution on 2013 Kenya Election, etc. (bipartisan; unanimous consent)
  • United States Institute of Peace – Africa
  • USAID Blog
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